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In the Stroop task, participants identify the print color of color words. The congruency
effect is the observation that response times and errors are increased when the word
and color are incongruent (e.g., the word “red” in green ink) relative to when they are
congruent (e.g., “red” in red). The proportion congruent (PC) effect is the finding that
congruency effects are reduced when trials are mostly incongruent rather than mostly
congruent. This PC effect can be context-specific. For instance, if trials are mostly
incongruent when presented in one location and mostly congruent when presented
in another location, the congruency effect is smaller for the former location. Typically, PC
effects are interpreted in terms of strategic control of attention in response to conflict,
termed conflict adaptation or conflict monitoring. In the present manuscript, however,
an episodic learning account is presented for context-specific proportion congruent
(CSPC) effects. In particular, it is argued that context-specific contingency learning
can explain part of the effect, and context-specific rhythmic responding can explain
the rest. Both contingency-based and temporal-based learning can parsimoniously be
conceptualized within an episodic learning framework. An adaptation of the Parallel
Episodic Processing model is presented. This model successfully simulates CSPC
effects, both for contingency-biased and contingency-unbiased (transfer) items. The
same fixed-parameter model can explain a range of other findings from the learning,
timing, binding, practice, and attentional control domains.
Keywords: context-specificity, contingency learning, temporal learning, computational modeling, attention,
conflict monitoring, proportion congruent effect, Stroop task
INTRODUCTION
One of the main areas of interest in experimental psychology is how the cognitive system controls
attention to maximize task performance (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Petersen and Posner, 2012). Consider the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Participants are much
slower and more error prone to identify the color of color words on incongruent trials (e.g.,
the word “red” printed in blue) relative to congruent trials (e.g., “red” in red). The difference
in performance between these two conditions is termed the congruency effect. Of course, the
impairments on incongruent trials indicate a (partial) failure of selective attention. However,
participants are reasonably accurate, indicating that participants are able to instantiate the goal
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to ignore the word and attend to the print color. In addition to
strategic adjustments of attention at the start of an experiment in
order to achieve task goals, the cognitive system might continue
to adapt attentional control dynamically throughout a task. One
particularly impactful idea, called the conflict monitoring (or
conflict adaptation) account, is that attention is dynamically
adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis in reaction to response conflict
(Botvinick et al., 2001).
One of the main sources of evidence presented in support
of the conflict monitoring account is the proportion congruent
(PC) effect (Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe and Mitterer,
1982; Logan et al., 1984). The PC effect is the observation that
congruency effects are much diminished when trials are mostly
incongruent (e.g., 75% incongruent, 25% congruent) relative
to mostly congruent (e.g., 75% congruent, 25% incongruent).
According to the conflict monitoring account, participants adapt
to the frequent conflict in the mostly incongruent condition by
decreasing attention to the distracting word (and/or increasing
attention to the color). As such, the word has a reduced impact on
color identification, thereby diminishing the congruency effect.
In the mostly congruent condition, however, conflict is less
frequent, and attention is, as a result, more “lazy.”
Though extremely popular, the conflict monitoring account
has been contested on several fronts (for reviews, Schmidt,
2013b; Schmidt et al., 2015). For instance, Schmidt and Besner
(2008; see also, Atalay and Misirlisoy, 2012; Grandjean et al.,
2013; Schmidt, 2013a, 2014a, 2016a; Hazeltine and Mordkoff,
2014; Levin and Tzelgov, 2016) presented the argument that
the (item-specific) PC effect might be due (primarily or even
entirely) to the learning of contingencies (i.e., correlations)
between color words and responses (for related ideas, see Logan
et al., 1984; Mordkoff, 1996; Melara and Algom, 2003). For
instance, in the mostly congruent condition, words are presented
most often in their congruent color (e.g., “red” 75% of the
time in red). As such, color words are strongly predictive of
the congruent response, which benefits congruent trials. On
incongruent trials (e.g., “red” in green), however, the word
mispredicts the color response, resulting in a cost. The net result
is an increased congruency effect. In the mostly incongruent
condition, the situation is reversed. Depending on the exact
manipulation, color words might be presented most often in
a specific incongruent color (e.g., “green” most often in red,
etc.). Thus, words are accurately predictive of the incongruent
response, and mispredict a congruent response. The net effect
is a reduced congruency effect. What is most interesting about
the contingency learning account of the PC effect is that it is
unrelated to conflict, control, or attention. The account argues
that the learning of stimulus-response correspondences is all that
matters.
Currently, it is general consensus that the majority of the
PC effect in the prototypical paradigm is due to contingency
learning. However, it is also clear that there are findings that
cannot be explained by simple contingency learning, and debate
still continues as to whether conflict monitoring produces these
remaining components of the PC effect (Blais and Bunge,
2010; Bugg and Chanani, 2011; Bugg et al., 2011a,b; Atalay
and Misirlisoy, 2012; Bugg and Hutchison, 2013; Grandjean
et al., 2013; Schmidt, 2013a,c, 2014a,b, 2016a; Bugg, 2014, 2015;
Hazeltine and Mordkoff, 2014; Levin and Tzelgov, 2016). For
instance, consider the list-level PC effect. Some inducer items
are manipulated for PC in separate groups of participants
(e.g., “red” and “blue” mostly congruent for one group, and
mostly incongruent for another), and these are intermixed with
other (contingency-unbiased) diagnostic items (e.g., “green” and
“yellow,” which have the same PC for both groups). A (list-
level) PC effect is, in some cases, observed for the diagnostic
items (e.g., Hutchison, 2011; Bugg, 2014; Wühr et al., 2015;
cf., Bugg et al., 2008; Blais and Bunge, 2010). That is, the
PC effect of the inducer items generalizes to the diagnostic
items.
Obviously, list-level PC effects cannot be explained by
contingency learning, given the lack of a contingency for
diagnostic items. However, Schmidt (2013c, 2014b) argued that
the list-level PC effect could be explained by temporal learning
(i.e., rhythmic responding). Response times tend to be rhythmic,
with the current RT typically similar to the RTs of immediately
preceding trials (Grosjean et al., 2001). This has implications
for (list-level) PC effects, because the task “pace” will tend
to be faster in the mostly congruent condition (where most
trials are easy) relative to the mostly incongruent condition
(where most trials are hard). According to the temporal learning
account, response initiation is speeded when the task pace can
be maintained. In particular, it is proposed that the (otherwise
stable) threshold to respond is decreased at the expected time, as
illustrated in Figure 1. That is, the amount of evidence needed to
select a response temporarily decreases when the expected time
approaches. If activation (evidence) for a response is sufficient to
cross this reduced threshold, responding is speeded (i.e., because
less evidence accrual was required to determine the response)
and the task pace is maintained. In contrast, if insufficient
activation has accrued to determine a response at the expected
time (e.g., because the trial was harder than average), then the
task pace is “broken,” the threshold to respond increases back to
normal, and the rhythmic benefit is lost. Similarly, if a response
is determined before the expected time to respond (e.g., because
the trial was easier than average), responding will, of course, be
fast, but will not have benefitted from a reduced threshold to
respond.
FIGURE 1 | A representation of how expectancy-driven reductions in
the response threshold can produce a proportion congruent effect. An
earlier drop in the threshold in the mostly congruent condition benefits
congruent trials, whereas a later drop in the threshold in the mostly
incongruent condition benefits incongruent trials.
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Because the mostly congruent condition contains mostly easy,
and therefore fast, congruent trials, the expected time to respond
will be earlier in the trial (i.e., around the time of a typical
congruent trial). As such, the faster task pace in the mostly
congruent condition will tend to benefit congruent trials, which
fit into the task rhythm, but not incongruent trials, which break
the task rhythm. The reverse is true in the mostly incongruent
condition, where a slower pace benefits incongruent trials, but
not congruent trials. This is also illustrated in Figure 1, and
is further illustrated visually in a trial-by-trial representation
in Figure 2. Temporal learning may therefore account for list-
level PC effects (Kinoshita et al., 2011), even for contingency-
unbiased diagnostic items (Schmidt, 2013c, 2014b, 2016b). As
an added aside, some threshold adjustment mechanisms can
produce a speed-accuracy trade-off, such that responding is
either faster but more error prone (low threshold) or slower
but less error prone (high threshold). However, the dynamically
adjusting threshold in the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP)
model does not produce a speed-accuracy trade-off in PC (or
congruency sequence) effects, but instead produces the same
pattern in errors as in response times (Schmidt, 2013c; Schmidt
and Weissman, 2016), just as in the participant data. This is
because the threshold is fixed, only temporarily dipping early
in the mostly congruent condition (benefitting congruent, but
increasing fast incongruent errors) and the reverse in the mostly
incongruent condition.
The above discussion illustrates how contingency and
temporal learning processes might explain item-specific and list-
level PC effects. The present manuscript focuses on another
variant of the PC task. The context-specific proportion congruent
(CSPC) effect is the finding that a PC effect is still observed when
mostly congruent and mostly incongruent trials are randomly
intermixed and only distinguished by a secondary contextual
cue. For instance, Corballis and Gratton (2003; see also, Wendt
et al., 2008) used flanker (rather than Stroop) stimuli and
presented participants mostly congruent stimuli on one side of
the screen (e.g., left), and mostly incongruent stimuli on the
other side (e.g., right). Even though (a) the two context were
FIGURE 2 | A visual representation of task pace on performance
across a series of trials in the mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent conditions. The response threshold is diminished at the
expected time to respond (gray), speeding any trials that can benefit from this
reduced threshold. This primarily benefits congruent trials in the mostly
congruent condition and incongruent trials in the mostly incongruent
condition.
randomly intermixed, and (b) the exact same stimuli were used
in both locations, congruency effects were smaller in the mostly
incongruent location than in the mostly congruent location. In
subsequent reports, Crump et al. (2006, 2008) used a similar
manipulation with Stroop-like stimuli. Again, a CSPC effect was
observed. Other reports have used stimulus dimensions other
than location as the contextual cue, such as text font (Bugg
et al., 2008), time duration (Wendt and Kiesel, 2011), and color
(Lehle and Hubner, 2008), but the present discussion will be
framed in the location-specific Stroop manipulations of Crump
and colleagues.
Typically, CSPC effects are interpreted in terms of context-
specific conflict monitoring (e.g., Crump et al., 2006). The
notion is that attention is more stringently controlled in the
mostly incongruent context (e.g., location), and more lax in the
mostly congruent context (e.g., another location). This, of course,
implies that attentional control can be adjusted extremely rapidly:
before a trial begins, the participant cannot possibly know which
contextual location they will experience. Indeed, a particularly
interesting detail of the experiments by Crump et al. (2006, 2008)
is that color words were presented at fixation, then removed from
the screen before a color patch was presented either above or
below fixation. Thus, participants could not know the PC context
until after the word was already removed from the screen (i.e.,
when target location was known). As such, participants cannot
know whether or not to attend to the word until after it is
already gone. This clearly indicates that if attentional control is
involved, it cannot be control of attention to perceptual inputs,
but must be occurring somewhere further down the processing
stream.
It is noteworthy that, task wide, words are not predictive of
colors in CSPC designs. Contingency learning may nevertheless
account for (part) of the CSPC effect, because the word and
location combined do strongly predict the color response. For
instance, if the mostly congruent location is up, then “red”
plus “up” likely indicates a red response. In contrast, “red”
plus “down” likely indicates a green response (or no response,
depending on the manipulation). In other words, the contingency
bias is identical, save for the fact that word and location
information must be used jointly to predict the color response.
Learning based on feature conjunctions is known to occur outside
the context of conflict paradigms like the Stroop task (Mordkoff
and Halterman, 2008), so it seems reasonable that location-word
combinations might be used to predict the likely color response
(see also, Holland, 1992 for a review of occasion setting).
However, context-specific contingency learning cannot be the
whole story. Crump and Milliken (2009; see also, Heinemann
et al., 2009; Crump et al., 2016; but see, Hutcheon and
Spieler, 2016) further demonstrated that if CSPC is manipulated
with some (contingency-biased) inducer items, there is still a
CSPC effect for other non-manipulated (contingency-unbiased)
diagnostic items. Paralleling the above discussion of item-specific
and list-level PC effects, the context-level (i.e., non-item-specific)
component of the CSPC effect might be explained by context-
specific (i.e., location-specific) temporal learning. The only added
assumption would, again, be that (non-conflict) learning can be
context-specific. In this case, participants might be learning a
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different pace for each contextual location. In support of this
notion, Schmidt et al. (2014) have already demonstrated that a
CSPC-like interaction can be observed in a non-conflict task.
In particular, “mostly easy” and “mostly hard” location contexts
were created with “easy” and “hard” items of a completely
different sort: high contrast (i.e., easy to see) and low contrast
(i.e., hard to see) letters. Figure 3 illustrates how context-specific
temporal learning can come about. At the start of the trial, of
course, the participant cannot know which location context they
will experience. However, as soon as the target color appears
above or below fixation, knowledge of the stimulus location can
be used to rapidly adjust the expected time to respond. Thus, an
earlier expected time to respond in the mostly congruent than
mostly incongruent condition can again be determined.
As the above discussions illustrate, the same procedural
concerns in standard, item-specific, and list-level PC designs also
apply to the CSPC design. The only added assumption is that
learning (of both contingencies and temporal information) can
be context/location-specific. Indeed, as the following sections
will demonstrate, this “added” assumption is not much of an
assumption at all, because context-specificity can be a simple by-
product of the same memory mechanisms required for simple
item-specific learning. In the simulations to follow, it will be
demonstrated how the PEP model is able to simulate CSPC
effects, including for contingency-unbiased diagnostic items,
using only contingency and temporal learning mechanisms.
FIGURE 3 | Illustration of a temporal learning mechanism as it relates
to context-specific proportion congruent effects. At the start of the trial,
the expected time to respond is the same for a mostly congruent or mostly
incongruent stimulus. However, as the contextual stimulus (e.g., location) is
processed, the expected time to respond can adjust dynamically. The
response threshold is decreased when real time is close to the expected time
to respond. Dashed line represents where expected time equals real time.
Dotted lines indicate the points where the current expectancy (solid line)
intersects with current real time.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Model
In this section, a brief conceptual overview of the PEP model is
presented. A full description of the math of Version 2.0 of the
model can be found in Schmidt et al. (2016), and the one small
change made for the current Version 2.1 of the model can be
found in the Supplementary Material of the current report. Full
documented source code of the model can also be downloaded
from the website of the author1.
The PEP model is depicted visually in Figure 4. At the bottom
of the model, there are Input nodes for each stimulus type (i.e.,
colors, words, and locations). On each trial, all Input nodes are
activated with random noise, and presented stimuli are further
activated with a signal. Thus, the model begins each trial with
random biases for each input, but over time identifies the color,
word, and location that are presented on the trial. Word and
color Input nodes pass on activation to Identity nodes, one
for each color concept. Within these nodes, lateral inhibition
produces a main effect of congruency. Note that locations do
not connect to Identity nodes, because they are unrelated to
the target color dimension (this is also true of words when
simulating experiments with color-unrelated neutral words), but
location nodes are otherwise exactly identical to word nodes.
Finally, activation from Identity nodes feeds forward to Response
nodes. Once activation for one of the Response nodes exceeds
the response threshold, the model responds. The number of
“cycles” (simulated milliseconds) the model takes to respond is
the simulated response time.
The above describes the algorithmic route of the model. The
actual “work” of the model in producing the effects of interest
in PEP model simulations is in the Episode nodes. During
each trial, a new Episode node is created, which codes for the
stimuli presented (word, color, and location), the response that
was made, and also the response time. On subsequent trials,
episodes are retrieved on the basis of the stimuli being currently
presented to the model. For instance, the word “blue” will activate
episodes coding for the word “blue.” Activated episodes have two
effects on processing. The first is via the contingency learning
mechanism (Schmidt, 2013a, 2016a; Schmidt et al., 2016). Each
activated episode facilitates response nodes proportional to
(a) how active the Episode node is, and (b) how strong the
connection between the episode and response is. This produces
a benefit for high contingency (accurately predictive) over low
contingency (wrongly predictive) trials, because, for instance, if
“green” is presented most often in red, then presenting the word
“green” will activate “green”-word episodes, most of which code
for (and therefore facilitate) red responses. Though less relevant
for the current simulations, recently encoded episodes have a
stronger effect on retrieval than older ones (for an extended
discussion, see Schmidt et al., 2016).
The second way that episodic retrieval influences processing
is via the temporal learning mechanism (see Schmidt, 2013c;
Schmidt and Weissman, 2016). In particular, activated episodes
are used to determine the expected time to respond. Like with
1users.ugent.be/∼jaschmid/PEP/
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FIGURE 4 | A visual depiction of the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model. There are Input nodes for each location, word, and color. Input nodes feed
activation to Identity nodes, where conflict can occur between color words and colors. Identity nodes feed activation to Response nodes, where a response is
selected. Via Episode nodes, locations, words, and colors activate the responses that they are connected to, in addition to affecting the response threshold
dynamically. Connections ending in circles indicate inhibition.
the contingency learning mechanism, recent events have a much
stronger effect on current-trial expectancies. As such, the model
expects to be able to respond at a similar speed as on previous
trials (see the Supplementary Material for the math on how this
is computed). The response threshold (i.e., amount of activation
required to select a response) temporarily decreases around the
time at which the current cycle time is close to the expected time
to respond. In this way, responding is speeded if the “pace” can
be maintained (i.e., a response is able to cross the temporarily
decreased threshold), but is not speeded if the pace is broken (e.g.,
not enough evidence for a response at the expected time).
Model Changes
No modifications need to be made to the PEP model
to simulate context-specific contingency learning. Context-
specific contingency learning is a logical consequence of the
same learning mechanism used for regular (“item-specific”)
contingency learning. With a “context-specific” PC manipulation
all that has changed is an added feature (e.g., location). If “red”
is presented most often in green in the bottom location, then
when “red” and “down” are presented together “red” will activate
“red” episodes and “down” will activate “down” episodes. This
means that episodes encoding for both “red” and “down” will be
very strongly activated. These episodes, of course, predominately
point to a green response. Thus, according to this episodic
conceptualization, “item-specific” and “context-specific” learning
are not really different. The only minor difference between the
two is that “context-specific” learning involves more than one
predictive dimension.
Changes to the temporal learning mechanism, however, were
required to simulate context-specific temporal learning. In the
previous versions of the PEP model, the temporal learning
mechanism was relatively simple. After each trial, the response
time was (and still is) directly encoded into the episode for that
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trial. During each trial, the model retrieved the last five encoded
episodes and each of these episodes decreased the response
threshold at the encoded time. The most recent episode had the
largest impact on the threshold and older ones had less and less
impact. One thing to note about this instantiation of a rhythmic
responding mechanism is that it is not item-specific. The last
five episodes are retrieved regardless of whether these episodes
match the currently presented stimuli. Secondly, episodes are
retrieved at a strength directly proportional to how old they are
and not based on connection weightings and episode activations.
This formulation of the temporal learning mechanism was for
simplicity only and changes in Version 2.1 of the PEP.
In the new version of the temporal learning mechanism,
several key changes are made. First, a single pace (expected time
to respond) is computed on each trial, rather than each retrieved
episode affecting the response threshold separately. Second, the
pace is adjusted during the course of the trial on the basis of which
episodes are activated. Thus, if the episodes that are activated
all happen to be trials in which a fast response was made, the
pace will speed. Conversely, if episodes where slow responses
were made are retrieved, the pace will slow. Thus, item-specific
(and context-specific) influences on the current-trial rhythm are
possible. Third, how much influence a given episode has on the
pace is determined by the weighting of the time information
for that episode. Just like the connections between episodes and
stimuli or responses, time weightings (newly added to the model)
are weakened with retrieval. Thus, recent events still have much
larger impacts on the response threshold, but for a different
reason than in the previous version of the model. Note that
this change also makes the contingency and temporal learning
mechanisms similar to one another (e.g., the prediction of what
response to make and when to make it are both determined by the
same episodic activations).
Full details of the new code are presented in the
Supplementary Material, but here a walkthrough is presented as
to how the temporal learning mechanism can produce a CSPC
effect for contingency-unbiased transfer items. At the start of a
trial, the pace is determined by the previous trial pace and the
immediately preceding RT. As such, the model is blind to the
upcoming context at this point. As the model begins to retrieve
episodes, however, the pace will adjust. If, for instance, a color
stimulus is presented in the top of the screen, episodes encoding
for “up” will become more active than episodes encoding for
“down.” If mostly congruent stimuli have been presented in the
top location, then most of these episodes will have a fast RT
encoded. As such, these activated episodes will bias the pace
toward a faster response. That is, the model expects a response
earlier on in the trial, which works to the advantage of (normally
fast) congruent trials, thereby increasing the congruency effect.
In contrast, when the color stimulus is presented in the mostly
incongruent location, most of the retrieved episodes will point to
a slow response. As such, a response will be expected later in the
trial, and this will work to the advantage of incongruent trials,
rather than congruent trials.
Because it may be unclear, it is important to stress why
this works for contingency-unbiased diagnostic items. Of course,
episodes that exactly match the current-trial stimuli (i.e., same
word, same location, and same color) are the most strongly
retrieved. However, episodes that only partially match the
current-trial stimuli are also retrieved to a lesser extent. For
instance, a diagnostic stimulus such as “blue” in yellow in the
top location will partially activate all nodes that code for the
word “blue,” all nodes that code for the color yellow, and, more
crucially, all nodes that code for the top location. Thus, “blue”
in yellow in the top location will also (partially) activate the
inducer items for the top location (e.g., “red” in red), which will
be 100% congruent. This is similar to the MINERVA 2 model
of Hintzman (1986), where multiple episodes are retrieved in
parallel, each in proportion to the overlap between the stimulus
presented and the stimulus encoded in memory (i.e., such that
partially similar episodes provide a weak contribution to the
“echo” from memory, and highly similar episodes provide a
stronger contribution). Thus, even though episodes are encoded
in a 100% item-specific fashion, retrieval from memory does
produce generalization. That is, inducers will influence time
expectancies for diagnostic items in a context-specific fashion.
Simulation Procedure and Data Analysis
All simulations were run with one fixed parameterization. That
is, the only thing that changes from simulation to simulation
is which stimuli are presented to the model. Using the same
fixed parameterization, it was also confirmed that Version
2.1 of the PEP model is backward compatible with previous
simulations (i.e., the model still produces all the same effects
that it was previously reported to simulate). Note that the model
aims for rough qualitative fit to data and does not aim to
match effects (or even overall RT) cycle-for-millisecond. This is
particularly the case given that the same fixed-parameter model
is used to simulate a broad range of effects from drastically
different paradigms (e.g., verbal and keypress Stroop, single letter
identification, prime-probe arrow tasks, Eriksen flanker tasks,
etc.). That is, rather than overfitting a model to one or two specific
experiments, the PEP model aims to demonstrate whether or not
a given process is able to produce a range of different effects.
Thus, the aim of the present simulations is to determine whether
the processes instantiated in the model are sufficient to produce
a CSPC effect of the correct form, and not to match exact effect
sizes.
Note that each simulated “participant” has the same base
parameters (e.g., same learning rate, etc.). This might be
reasonably changed in the future to model inter-individual
differences (e.g., by assigning parameters to each participant
from a Gaussian distribution). However, there is plenty of noise
throughout the model, such that each simulated participant
does produce different results. To ensure robustness, 500
simulated “participants” were run for each simulation. Given
this large “sample,” certainty of whether the model does or
does not produce an effect is well above that for a typical
experimental sample (i.e., ps 0.05). Thus, numerical effect sizes
are discussed, but no statistics are reported for brevity. However,
all effects that are discussed are statistically significant. Also, only
response times are presented both for brevity and because the
original CSPC experiments reported null CSPC effects for errors
(or did not analyze errors at all). However, results for errors
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are comparable to the RT data (i.e., there is no speed-accuracy
trade-off; see “Introduction”) and are not excessively inflated (as
can be a problem in some models). It is worth noting, however,
that errors were essentially non-existent (<1%) in the original
participant data, whereas the model produced incongruent trial
error rates more comparable to a standard Stroop paradigm.
The smaller error rates in the CSPC participant data relative
to a standard Stroop task might be due to the spatially- and
temporally-separated distracters, a detail which is not reflected in
the PEP model. This point will be discussed in further detail in the
“General Discussion.” Error data and the data from the backward
compatibility simulations are available for download from the
website of the author (along with the model code download).
Simulation 1: Base CSPC Effect
Simulation 1 models the basic location-based CSPC effect. In
particular, Experiment 2a of Crump et al. (2006) is simulated. The
design is presented in Table 1. Trials consist of the word “red,”
“green,” “blue,” or “yellow” presented at fixation for 100 cycles
followed by the a red, green, blue, or yellow patch presented above
or below fixation until a response or 2000 cycles elapsed. In each
block of 96 trials, there are 48 mostly congruent location trials,
where the color word is followed by the congruent color 75% of
the time. In the remaining 48 mostly incongruent location trials,
color words are followed by each of the four display colors equally
often (75% incongruent). As in the original report, the model was
presented four blocks of trials (384 trials total). The simulation
was run twice: once with the model as normal, and once with
the temporal learning mechanism lesioned. The purpose of the
second run was to demonstrate context-specific contingency
learning. Because the PEP model will produce a CSPC effect
via both the contingency and temporal learning mechanisms,
lesioning the latter is necessary to demonstrate the former is also
contributing to the effect (and in Simulation 2, a contingency-free
demonstration of context-specific temporal learning is provided).
This lesion was achieved by fixing the response threshold, rather
than allowing it to vary (see Supplementary Material).
The results of Simulation 1 can be observed in Figure 5,
along with the participant data from the original report. As
can be observed, a location-based CSPC effect is observed both
with or without the temporal learning mechanism. However,
the CSPC effect is much larger in the normal model (54 cycles)
than in the model with a lesioned temporal learning mechanism
(10 cycles). The latter of the two simulations confirms that
the contingency learning mechanism designed for simple item-
specific learning produces context-specific contingency learning
TABLE 1 | Simple context-specific proportion congruent (CSPC) design.
Color Up (mostly congruent) Down (mostly incongruent)
Red Green Blue Yellow Red Green Blue Yellow
Red 9 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Green 1 9 1 1 3 3 3 3
Blue 1 1 9 1 3 3 3 3
Yellow 1 1 1 9 3 3 3 3
FIGURE 5 | Simulation 1 normal model cycle times (top left), lesioned
model cycle times (top right), and participant response times (bottom).
without any modifications. The larger effect in the non-lesioned
model demonstrates the added contribution of context-specific
temporal learning (see also, Simulation 2). It is noteworthy that
both the overall congruency effect and CSPC effect are larger in
the modeled data than in the participant data. This might suggest
that the strength of activation of the distracting word could be
weakened somewhat (to be discussed in further detail in the
“General Discussion”). However, the goal of the model is only
to match rough qualitative fit, rather than precise quantitative
fit. That is, the important point is that this simulation confirms
that CSPC effects can be produced by contingency and temporal
learning mechanisms. The model does not require a conflict
monitor or attentional control device. It is also noteworthy that,
numerically, the effect in the participant data seemed to be
slightly larger for congruent trials than for incongruent trials,
whereas the reverse is true in the modeled data. However, this
is only an (untested) numerical trend in the participant data
that does not appear to be consistent across studies (e.g., see the
participant data modeled in Simulation 2).
Simulation 2: CSPC Effect for Diagnostic
Items
Simulation 2 models the CSPC effect for contingency-unbiased
diagnostic items. In particular, Experiment 1 of Crump and
Milliken (2009) is simulated. Diagnostic items are particularly
interesting, because a CSPC effect for these items might seem
strongly indicative of conflict monitoring. The present simulation
demonstrates why this conclusion is too strong. The design
of this experiment is presented in Table 2. The experiment is
identical to that simulated in Simulation 1, except that there
are two item types. Two items (e.g., “red” and “green”) are
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TABLE 2 | Context-specific proportion congruent design with inducer and
diagnostic items.
Color Up (mostly congruent) Down (mostly incongruent)
Red Green Blue Yellow Red Green Blue Yellow
Red 12 12
Green 12 12
Blue 6 6 6 6
Yellow 6 6 6 6
presented 100% with the congruent color in one location (mostly
congruent context), and 100% with the incongruent color in the
other location (mostly incongruent context). The remaining two
items (“blue” and “yellow”) are presented equally often in the
congruent and incongruent color in both location contexts. As
in the original report, the model was presented four blocks of 96
trials each (384 trials total).
The results of Simulation 2 are presented in Figure 6,
along with the original participant data. As can be observed,
a CSPC effect is again successfully modeled, but this time for
contingency-unbiased items. This 27 cycle effect therefore
demonstrates that the context-specific temporal learning
mechanism does allow for the inducer items to influence the
context-specific rhythm for diagnostic items. It might be again
noted that the congruency effect (and, proportionately, the CSPC
effect) are notably larger in the modeled data. Again, the relatively
small congruency effect in the participant data likely indicates
the reduced influence of the spatially- and temporally-separated
word dimension.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present series of simulations demonstrated the proof-
of-principle that location-based CSPC effects can result from
context-specific contingency and temporal learning. Most
importantly, even CSPC effects for contingency-unbiased
diagnostic items can be explained by this episodic learning
model. It is also critical to highlight that the model does not
measure response conflict, as in the conflict monitoring model.
FIGURE 6 | Simulation 2 model cycle times (left) and participant data
(right) for diagnostic items.
Similarly, the PEP model does not adjust attention in response to
conflict. Instead, the model maximizes performance by retrieving
memories of past events in order to anticipate what response is
likely given the stimuli presented, and when to respond on the
basis of the same memories.
It should also be noted that the PEP model is not specifically
developed to explain one narrow phenomenon. The same
model, with one fixed-parameter set, also explains a range of
findings outside the “cognitive control” domain, such as the
power law of practice, color-word contingency learning and
acquisition curves, mixing costs, and stimulus-response binding
effects (Schmidt et al., 2016). It also explains a range of so-
called “cognitive control” phenomena, such as item-specific PC
effects, list-level PC effects for contingency-unbiased diagnostic
items, congruency sequence effects in a paradigm that eliminates
feature integration and contingency confounds, and asymmetric
list shifting effects (Schmidt, 2013a,c, 2016a,b; Schmidt and
Weissman, 2016). Including the two newly added simulations of
CSPC effects, this totals 14 experiments spanning the practice,
learning, binding, timing, and attentional control domains. Of
particular interest, the “attentional control” phenomena are, in
the PEP model, a product of the basic learning mechanisms
required to simulate performance in non-conflict tasks. No
conflict monitoring or attentional adjustment homunculi are
needed as supplementary assumptions. The episodic account that
the PEP model instantiates is therefore much more parsimonious
than the conflict monitoring alternative.
Though the episodic account may be more parsimonious,
it may, of course, be the case that conflict monitoring does
play a role in these paradigms (e.g., in addition to the non-
conflict learning biases). Indeed, the present simulations do
nothing to argue against this possibility. Instead, the present
simulations only demonstrate the feasibility of the simple
episodic account. Some additional evidence does add further
plausibility to the account proposed here, however. In addition
to demonstrations of context-specific contingency learning
(Mordkoff and Halterman, 2008) and context-specific temporal
learning (Schmidt et al., 2014) in non-conflict tasks (i.e., where
conflict monitoring is presumably impossible), King et al. (2012)
reanalysed CSPC data with a linear ballistic accumulator model to
contrast two competing interpretations of the effect. In particular,
the conflict monitoring account suggests that CSPC effects come
about because of shifts in the amount of attention to target
and distracting stimuli. This implies that a change in the drift
rate (i.e., rate of activation) for stimuli produces the CSPC
effect. In contrast, the CSPC effect might result from changes
in the response threshold (i.e., amount of evidence needed to
select a response), indicative of expectancies. Their modeling
results support the latter notion. This is seemingly inconsistent
with the conflict monitoring hypothesis, because it is unclear
how changes in attention to targets and distracters could be
reflected in thresholds. King and colleagues interpret their results
in terms of response caution (van Maanen et al., 2011), which
is heavily related to the temporal learning account presented
in the present paper (i.e., threshold adjustments resulting from
expectancies), in addition to other time-based learning models
(e.g., Grice, 1968; Kohfeld, 1968; Ollman and Billington, 1972;
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Van Duren and Sanders, 1988; Strayer and Kramer, 1994a,b;
Kinoshita et al., 2011). Though these results do not rule out
the possibility that conflict monitoring may play some role in
the CSPC effect, like the present results, these modeling efforts
add additional credence to the notion that non-attention based
learning accounts are viable competing alternative explanations.
On the other hand, if attention does play some role in the
CSPC effect, differences in attentional distribution in the mostly
congruent and mostly incongruent contexts may originate from
a factor unrelated to conflict. In particular, differences in stimulus
informativeness in the mostly congruent and mostly incongruent
conditions (Schmidt, 2014a) might lead to contingent attentional
capture biases (Dishon-Berkovits and Algom, 2000; Jiang and
Chun, 2001; Melara and Algom, 2003; Cosman and Vecera,
2014). For instance, Dishon-Berkovits and Algom manipulated
the extent to which a distracting stimulus was predictive of
(i.e., contingent with) the target stimulus. When a predictive
contingency was present, word-word Stroop effects (i.e., both
the target and distracter are words) were observed. The authors
argued that attention was increased to the (predictive) distracter
because it was informative for responding. However, when the
distracter and targets were uncorrelated (i.e., every distracter
presented equally often with all targets), the word-word Stroop
effect was eliminated. They argued that, in this case, attention
to the (unpredictive) distracter was reduced, thereby eliminating
interference. In this way, presence of a contingency between
distracters and targets can “capture” attention. In the original
studies of Crump et al. (2006; but not in Crump and Milliken,
2009), words were predictive of the congruent color in the mostly
congruent context, but unpredictive of the color in the mostly
incongruent context. One might argue that this could lead to
differences in contingency-driven (rather than conflict-driven)
attentional capture in the two context. On the other hand, this
would assume that attention to the word is adjusted after the
word has already disappeared (i.e., when the contextual location
is known). Thus, as with the conflict monitoring account, it
would have to be assumed that any adjustment in processing
occurs some time after initial perceptual processing. Still, if a
compelling demonstration of a clear attentional contribution to
the CSPC effect can be observed, additional work might focus
on distinguishing between conflict monitoring and contingent
attentional capture.
Before closing, it is important to note that there were some
minor discrepancies between the modeled and participant data.
Most notably, the model produced much larger congruency
effects and, proportionately, larger CSPC effects than was
observed in the participant data. Though not presented for
brevity, the error congruency effect was also notably increased.
Although the PEP model did produce the correct qualitative
pattern of results (the express goal of this investigation), it is
worth speculating over this quantitative difference. The model
produced congruency effects and PC effects of a magnitude
comparable to a standard Stroop task (i.e., color word printed in
color). The reason for the much smaller effects in the participant
data of CSPC experiments may originate from the fact that
the distracting word is spatially- and temporally-separated from
the target color. Indeed, the word is presented in a location
(center) that is never a target location. Thus, the word likely
receives less attention in such experiments, diminishing the
impact of the word (Glaser and Glaser, 1982). Thus, one
might reasonably argue that distracting word activation could be
weakened in simulations of this sort of experiment. However, it
is generally contrary to the fixed-parameter philosophy guiding
development of the PEP framework to make simulation-by-
simulation adjustments of parameters, so the results have been
presented “as is.”
Context-specific proportion congruent effects are particularly
interesting, because their existence implies that the cognitive
system is able to very rapidly adapt to task-irrelevant (i.e.,
non-target) contextual information processed in parallel with
task-relevant target stimuli. The transfer of the CSPC effect
to contingency-unbiased diagnostic items is, at first glance,
seemingly one of the most compelling pieces of evidence in
support of the notion that conflict monitoring must play some
role in performance. However, the current manuscript illustrates
why this strong conclusion may not be warranted. Proportional
and inducer/diagnostic item manipulations are typically used
for the purpose of studying the effects of high versus
low conflict contexts on attentional control. Unfortunately,
these manipulations also introduce unintended (i.e., conflict-
unrelated) regularities to the task. The human cognitive machine
is particularly adept at picking up on such task regularities and
using the acquired knowledge to automate performance and
facilitate responding during expected events. To what extent the
simple (non-conflict) episodic learning account presented in the
current manuscript is a full (rather than just partial) description
of CSPC effects is uncertain, but it is hoped that this report will
encourage further investigation of these interesting questions.
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